In a little over two years, Expo 2027 is set to take place in the Serbian capital, an event that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić perceives as a hallmark achievement of his administration, according to Jutarnji list.

This Croatian media outlet notes that, despite its title, this is not the grand World Exhibition, the “Exposition universelle”, which resulted in landmark structures like the Eiffel Tower in Paris and the Palace of Fine Arts in San Francisco.

A “real” world exhibition occurs every five years, with this year’s event in Osaka, Japan expected to attract 28 million visitors.

Belgrade will host a “small Expo”, a specialized thematic exhibition that exists between the major world expos.

Regardless of Vučić’s attempts to theatrically portray the Belgrade Expo as the most significant global event in 2027, the facts do not support these grandiose claims.

The stature and significance of these smaller exhibitions are perhaps best exemplified by their history in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, where they took place thrice: in 1981, 1985, and 1991. Unlike a typical world exhibition lasting half a year, these smaller events are restricted to three months, occupy 25 hectares, and are entirely organized by the host. In contrast, this year’s real Expo in Osaka spans 155 hectares, while the forthcoming one in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, will cover 2030 hectares.

Specialized exhibitions are always centered around a theme.

According to Jutarnji List, Serbs plan to dedicate Belgrade’s event to what they believe are their specialties: sports and music.

Locally, Belgrade’s čaršija mockingly refers to it as the “Expo from AliExpress,” arguing that “it’s not the authentic experience.” Nevertheless, it will generate considerable revenue: the exhibition’s official cost is estimated at 1.29 billion euros.

For that sum, three Pelješac bridges or about a hundred kilometers of highway could be constructed, projects that are swiftly being executed in Serbia, even in areas where, by traditional metrics, there is no justified demand.

However, the regime aims to forge strategic partnerships by channeling contracts to companies and countries that might offer political backing. Infrastructure projects in Serbia are being developed by Chinese firms, Azerbaijani interests, and the American company “Bechtel”, which previously constructed the A1 highway during former Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader’s time, whose era ended in corruption scandals.

The proposed €1.3 billion for the Belgrade Expo only covers direct expenses. When considering related costs not formally categorized under the exhibition—such as asphalt work on city streets, new road constructions, and enhancements to water supply and sewage systems—the total could balloon to €17 billion. For context, the budget for the six-month Expo 2030 in Riyadh is a mere €8 billion.

Jutarnji List highlights that in Vučić’s Serbia, it is almost customary for prices to surge uncontrollably due to “cost increases” and “unforeseen additional work.”

For example, the reconstruction of the Novi Sad railway station, originally contracted for €3.5 million, ultimately cost €15.8 million, according to former Minister Goran Vesić.

A connecting transversal road of just over 112 km contracted with “Bechtel” was initially priced at €900 million, yet Serbia has already expended over €1.6 billion, with the project still incomplete.

Civil engineer Danijel Dašić claims that the reconstruction of a 108 km railway from Novi Sad to the Hungarian border was significantly overpaid to Chinese contractors.

The cost for constructing a completely new railway on flat terrain is estimated at €4 to €5 million per kilometer, yet Serbia paid around €10 million for mere reconstruction and upgrades.

A large portion of the funds is funneled to local subcontractors, typically obscure companies with dubious connections to the ruling elite.

Numerous instances of price inflation have been reported. Builders and economists assert that cost inflation is rampant and “normal” in Serbia; contracted values can double and occasionally surge up to 400%. Consequently, the estimated €17 billion for the expo could inflate to as much as €35 or even €50 billion, with taxpayer money potentially flowing into the pockets of Vučić’s associates.

While the lackluster opposition has been lamenting its fate since the onset of progressive governance in 2012—promising a better future without concrete action—Vučić has built a network of allies and entities aimed at prolonging his power with minimal oversight to maximize profits for his circle.

Jutarnji List describes Vučić’s project paradigm as “Belgrade on the Water”, which involves the demolition of existing infrastructure near the Stari Most and Gazela Bridge, often with the assistance of masked groups evicting residents while the police stand down. The 2027 exhibition now poses a potential threat to this costly undertaking.

To facilitate the “deal of the century,” Vučić exploited his absolute majority in Parliament, pushing through laws designating the Expo as a project of national significance. By the end of 2023, a “Law on Special Procedures for the Implementation of International Specialized Exhibitions” was enacted, permitting public procurement without tenders and expediting many processes. The arrogance displayed has persisted despite three months of protests, including regulations facilitating facility use without permits or inspections, a severe oversight exposed by the collapse of the Novi Sad canopy due to regulatory violations.

Additionally, projects are to be implemented on an expedited basis, with limited allowances for deferral if deemed urgent by the state. With everything framed as an urgent national interest, finance minister and Vučić’s trusted ally Siniša Mali handles the operations.

Under the guise of “investing in Expo,” Serbia will allocate substantial financial resources without proper procedural transparency. For the €17, €35, or €50 billion to circulate among Vučić’s compliant businessmen, two conditions must be satisfied: the president must maintain (absolute) power until 2027, and societal unrest must not jeopardize the exhibition. The growing public discontent has begun to unsettle Vučić and his associates.

A long-time acquaintance from a major construction firm, with annual revenues exceeding €10 million, expressed: “Expo is a chance; if all plans come to fruition, many could move to Monaco or Florida and retire. Let these nuisances ruin it for us! Of course, I will defend this regime, but we haven’t received any guidance. Once Expo concludes, Vučić can emigrate or face imprisonment; I don’t care. But let’s finish this project first.”

Numerous individuals share similar sentiments, waiting for directions that never arrive. The apparent weakness of both Vučić and his entire regime is becoming evident; years of authoritarianism are giving way to public pushback.

All manner of hooligans within the regime previously reveled in immunity and wielded force at will. However, with public pressure rising, many now fear possible accountability for their actions.

Initially, the regime’s instinct was to respond with force, yet after three months, not only are the orders being given cautiously, but even enforcers hesitate to act for fear of losing support from an increasingly uncontrollable system.

While an immediate collapse of Aleksandar Vučić’s regime is unlikely, the surge of civic activism has been stirring hope for change.

The student movement has yet to propose a viable alternative for governance post-Vučić, nor has it introduced a leader to direct a transitional Serbia. Their most fervent supporters would likely oppose governance by mysterious “plenums,” assemblies of young adults making decisions at their faculties.

However, the mobilized public, reinforced by student activism, has started to challenge the regime’s vulnerabilities. Increasingly, protesters are targeting the Expo, perceiving its significance as a financial lifeline for Vučić’s hold on power. Calls for cancelation are growing in both confidence and clarity.

Researching the rules of the organizing body overseeing the Expo, the “Bureau International des Expositions” (BIE), Novi Sad lawyer Aleksandar Olenik found that there are five conditions under which the BIE can deny a host the right to hold the exhibition. Three of those appear to describe Serbia’s current situation:

– Large-scale civil unrest;

– Corruption and mismanagement risking contracts with unqualified companies;

– Suppression of civil liberties, including persecution of journalists and activists.

Rumors circulated in Belgrade that BIE inspectors had appeared just as students were blockading intersections throughout the day, with many hoping this could lead to cancellation of the event.

A spokesperson for the state-owned “Expo 2027 Belgrade” denied any such inspections were occurring, stating the next review is not scheduled until April.

Concerned that authorities might prioritize holding the Expo over addressing protests and their demands, citizens have begun advocating for the cancellation of what they’re calling a “generator of corruption and lawlessness.” Petitions are proliferating on social media platforms.

The BIE is generally averse to cancellations; only one small Expo, planned for Buenos Aires in 2023, has been called off, attributed to the Argentine government citing Covid and financial challenges. The fear of facing cancellations for two consecutive exhibitions surely unsettles the BIE.

The BIE might overlook anonymous cancellation petitions, even if they gather tens of thousands of signatures online. Nonetheless, the campaign has gained support from prominent IT entrepreneur and businessman Nenad Milanović, founder of “Cake,” with an annual turnover of $85 million.

This California-based Serb has been backing the protests from the onset, recently stating he would self-fund an international lawsuit against the BIE for permitting the Belgrade Expo to proceed amid evident justification for its cancelation.

Following his announcement, Cake.com experienced a significant DDOS attack, which Milanović attributed to Vučić’s supporters. He managed to repel the attack at considerable cost and is exploring further political and legal actions against the BIE.

While the BIE seems currently unpressured enough to cancel the Belgrade Expo, discomfort is palpable amidst the escalating opposition to Vučić’s plans. They may soon need to make a public statement, however vague, especially as Milanović’s legal team pursues avenues in French courts.

The Serbian government, confronted by three months of protests that have yet to topple it, may trigger its end by the BIE’s eventual public statement. The mere thought of Expo 2027 being in jeopardy might incite chaos among Vučić’s associates and prompt dissent from within.

Wishing for such an outcome, critics of Vučić continue their protests, a response the current regime seems ill-equipped to counter. A change in leadership driven by civic action may take time, unless hastened by an external factor, with significant moments approaching shortly.

From “modest commission” to state marijuana farm

Jutarnji List comments that the tactics through which Vučić’s associates amass wealth—both legitimately and illicitly—could fill a textbook on nepotism, cover-ups, corruption, and organized crime.

From embedding favoritism in every state contract (or that involving the SNS, which operates almost as a state) to inventing unnecessary projects and legalizing overt crime, Vučić didn’t create state and party corruption but merely refined it. While corruption existed under previous administrations, the current regime has escalated the traditional five percent commission from contracts to as high as fifteen to twenty percent.

A noteworthy facet of the countless inflated expenses arises when foreign dignitaries visit Belgrade; every lamppost along the routes they will never use is festooned with flags from Serbia and their homeland, requiring urgent purchases without redundancies in the tender process. Such contracts are consistently awarded to shell companies. Often, holiday lighting is installed well before the holiday, paid for by the day. During state and religious holidays, municipal celebrations necessitate concerts, typically featuring local folk music, at an expense covered by the public, where trusted party affiliates undertake the arrangements.

As time passed, the progressive government’s spree of corruption led to an organic marijuana farm surfacing in suburban Belgrade. Following an arrest related to drug trafficking, police found marijuana production spanning twelve hectares, complete with weapons and false police IDs, during their investigation of an organic farm.

The response from authorities included arrests and transfers of inspectors who disrupted what was clearly state-controlled operation. The owner involved in the marijuana farm has continued to evade conviction, even suing the court and harassing journalists documenting what has come to be known as the “Jovanjica” case.

It is, therefore, against such unbridled corruption—with no accountability for societal and humanitarian repercussions—that both students and the public are currently protesting.

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