In Washington, the discourse surrounding the Donald Trump administration’s foreign policy has largely dwelled on Ukraine, China, the Middle East, and recently, Greenland. However, the Western Balkans have been largely overlooked. Any shifts in U.S. policy in this region might jeopardize its already precarious status quo. As of now, the delicate geopolitical balance in the Western Balkans has helped Bosnia and Herzegovina avoid a return to civil war, while the standoff between Serbia and Kosovo has persisted for 26 years.

Serbian nationalists, particularly, are hopeful for Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office. They believe that his administration will foster closer ties between Washington and Belgrade, as well as Republika Srpska.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik are eager for the U.S. to confront other Western nations and organizations that staunchly support Kosovo’s independence and the centralized framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). This framework was established by the 1995 U.S.-mediated Dayton Peace Agreement, which strictly divided the conflict-ridden nation into two primary entities: Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH, governed by a central authority with a rotating presidency among the three main communities: Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.

In his quest to promote Serbian interests and foster Serbian unification, Dodik has persistently undermined the Dayton Agreement by obstructing BiH state institutions, a move deemed dangerous and destabilizing by the U.S. and other Western nations.

Practically speaking, this would involve relaxing U.S. sanctions on pro-Russian Serbs advocating for Serbian unification, who oppose sanctions against Moscow. This includes sanctions on Dodik and ultranationalists like Serbian Vice President Aleksandar Vulin, known for his past leadership of the Serbian Security and Information Agency and close ties to Moscow, as well as his persecution of Russian émigrés opposing President Vladimir Putin in Serbia.

Moreover, the previous U.S. administration imposed sanctions on NIS, the Serbian oil and gas company, which is predominantly owned by Gazprom. It is not far-fetched to envision Trump easing pressure on Serbia regarding its connection to Russia while remaining mum on human rights matters in the country.

Supporters of a “Greater Serbia” assert claims to territories across the former Yugoslavia and beyond Serbia’s current borders. The ambition for a Greater Serbia spearheaded by then-Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević was a significant catalyst for the wars that fractured the region in the 1990s.

Although Vučić has professed that his administration is disinterested in altering international borders, many of Serbia’s neighbors harbor suspicions that Belgrade is biding its time to fulfill a vision of a Greater Serbia. A 13-page declaration, ratified by Serbia and Republika Srpska in June 2024, delineates a strategy aimed at restoring parts of Kosovo under Belgrade’s authority and undermining Bosnia’s autonomy.

Vučić and Dodik desire U.S. support against other Western nations that back Kosovo’s independence and Bosnia’s centralized governance structure.

Immediately following Trump’s electoral victory last November, Vučić engaged in a “very cordial” phone conversation with him, extending an invitation to Belgrade and commending Trump for his knowledge of Serbia, noting that Trump’s approval ratings are higher in Serbia than in any other European country.

Richard Grenell, who served as the special presidential envoy for peace talks between Serbia and Kosovo from 2019 to 2021, played a crucial role in nurturing friendly relations between Washington and Belgrade during Trump’s initial term. Even during Joe Biden’s presidency, Grenell made several trips to Belgrade. He was awarded the Order of the Serbian Flag in 2023, with Vučić praising him for “witnessing the truth about the developments in Kosovo and the region.”

Regardless of Grenell’s influence in Trump’s anticipated second term, Kosovo may have legitimate concerns about the implications of a Trump administration. The U.S. recognized Kosovo’s independence in 2008, and most UN member states, including a significant portion of European countries, concur. Nevertheless, Serbia, Russia, China, and many non-Western nations continue to regard Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia.

Given Russia and China’s positions on the UN Security Council, it is highly unlikely that Kosovo’s independence will receive formal acknowledgement from the UN. Trump has previously threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from KFOR, the NATO-led peacekeeping mission, causing alarm among officials in Pristina.

Even if Trump follows through on this threat, it may not pose an existential crisis for Kosovo. KFOR could likely maintain its operations in the event of a U.S. withdrawal, especially since Pristina has been bolstering ties with Turkey in recent years.

Following the violent clashes in May 2023 between KFOR and Serbia, Turkey dispatched a battalion of commandos to Kosovo and sold “Bayraktar” drones to Pristina. In late 2024, Turkey’s Machinery and Chemical Industries Corporation and Kosovo finalized an agreement to construct an ammunition production facility in Kosovo.

Dodik stated in late 2023 that a Trump electoral victory in 2024 would yield a “more favorable geopolitical environment for Republika Srpska,” and under such conditions, he would declare the independence of the Serbian entity. After Trump’s success, Dodik characterized it as a “victory” for Republika Srpska, even donning a MAGA hat in front of his presidential palace. Banja Luka maintains amicable ties with Moscow, which views the unrest in Bosnia as an opportunity, regarding Republika Srpska as the “Balkan Transnistria” — reminiscent of the Russian-leaning segment of Moldova.

This pro-Russian enclave within Bosnia keeps NATO and the European Union apprehensive about instability in the Western Balkans, a tactic the Kremlin can leverage to divert attention from Ukraine, consequently obstructing Bosnia’s aspirations for NATO membership.

Meanwhile, Western sanctions against Dodik have pushed Republika Srpska closer to China. The agreement formalizing ties between RS and China, signed in 2016, has led to Chinese investments in infrastructure projects and power plants throughout the Bosnian Serb territory.

Russia is leveraging the tense circumstances in Bosnia and Herzegovina to its benefit, seeing Republika Srpska as the “Balkan Transnistria.”

Washington and London have sanctioned Dodik for corruption and actions that imperil Bosnia’s fragile balance. The U.S. under President Barack Obama first sanctioned the pro-Kremlin Bosnian Serb leader in January 2017 for his refusal to comply with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Constitutional Court’s decisions. Dodik hopes that Trump will relieve U.S. pressure, allowing him to obstruct the Dayton Accords freely.

Officials in Banja Luka are optimistic that Washington might adopt a more lenient stance compared to the majority of EU and NATO member states that regard the preservation of the Dayton Accords as pivotal for stability in Southeast Europe. They envision a policy shift that aligns more closely with Hungary regarding the Western Balkans. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has established strong connections with Vučić, Dodik, and Putin, has positioned Hungary as the most favorable EU nation in pressing for decreased Western pressure on Dodik. Orban, Vučić, and Dodik have forged a triadic alliance, and some speculate that Trump might become the fourth member of this coalition.

Should the Bosnian Serb authority succeed in persuading Washington to lift sanctions, “he will undoubtedly feel encouraged to pursue his agenda more assertively,” asserted Vladimir Trapara, a senior fellow at the Institute for International Politics and Economics in Belgrade. While Dodik may signal support for separatism to energize his base in RS, he is unlikely to back such a bold action given the array of practical circumstances, including the looming threat of renewed conflict in the Balkans.

Trapara made a distinction between Dodik’s populist rhetoric and his “true political aspirations.” The Bosnian Serb leader often utilizes the separatism narrative to garner support from Serbian nationalists when politically advantageous, subsequently steering his focus towards governance when tensions are lower.

Known for his pragmatic foreign policy approach, Trump is expected to seek significant diplomatic and business opportunities in the Western Balkans. The Trump family’s business interests in Serbia include Affinity Partners (Jared Kushner’s investment firm), which secured a 99-year lease to construct a luxury hotel in Belgrade, a site that faced NATO bombardment in 1999, as well as investments approximating $X billion in upscale hotels and villas along the Albanian coast.

Orban, Vučić, and Dodik have formed a triple alliance, with speculation that Trump will integrate into this coalition as a fourth figure.

Such commercial interests could influence the Trump administration’s stance toward the region, possibly complicating dynamics, given that aims in Albania may clash with increasingly favorable policies toward Belgrade. After all, Trump is recognized for making foreign policy decisions driven by the highest bidder and personal connections rather than through conventional institutional channels.

Regarding Bosnia’s territorial integrity, authorities in Banja Luka appear to believe that the Trump administration might deprioritize the mechanisms for implementing the Dayton Agreement. Trump’s overall disinterest in so-called transatlantic values, alongside his good rapport with Orban and Vučić, could propel decision-makers in RS to cultivate high expectations related to Trump 2.0.

“While Belgrade may not overtly pursue territorial ambitions, Trump’s transactional foreign policy could yield opportunities for subtle advancements of nationalist objectives,” explained Petar Milutinović, a researcher at the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade. “Dodik, in particular, could leverage a perceived U.S. withdrawal to amplify calls for RS independence.”

However, outcomes could deviate from expectations—assumptions that Trump’s transactional foreign policy will unfailingly yield favorable results for Serbia are overly simplistic. Albania and Kosovo are investing resources into lobbying in the United States to promote their interests, which includes urging Washington to advocate for Kosovo’s independence, fortifying the Albanian-U.S. alliance and maintaining pressure on Belgrade.

Additionally, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s role could prove significant, given Ankara’s established relations with Sarajevo, Tirana, and Pristina.

“If used adeptly, the cordial relations between Erdogan and Trump could enhance the United States’ contact with Bosniaks and Albanians, which currently exists in a rather dysfunctional state,” detailed Jahja Muhasilović, a geopolitical analyst and associate professor at the International University of Sarajevo.

If Trump fulfills his commitment to stabilizing the situation between Russia and Ukraine—with segments of Ukrainian territory remaining under Russian influence—the reverberations will resonate throughout Europe. A diplomatic resolution on Ukraine could portray the West as feeble, particularly if accompanied by the lifting of certain sanctions against Russia. Pro-Russian Serbian nationalists might interpret this scenario as a “win for Moscow’s agenda,” heightening their anti-Western rhetoric and calls for regional reorganization, including advocating for RS secession or undermining Kosovo’s autonomy, Milutinović noted.

Dejan Šajinović, a Bosnian columnist and editor for Nezavisne Novine, highlighted that Belgrade finds comfort in a balanced influence in the region, with both NATO and Russia making concessions to Serbia. “Whenever one side gains an advantage, it disrupts the equilibrium, leading to instability in the Balkans,” he mentioned.

Trump’s unpredictability suggests that the hopefulness of Dodik and other Serbians may be misplaced. Concurrently, persistent Russian influence in Southeast Europe will constrict Belgrade and Banja Luka’s outreach to Washington. Thus, with Trump anticipated to reclaim the presidency, Serbian nationalists should weigh their desires cautiously.

The author is the CEO and founder of Gulf State Analytics

This article was published in the magazine “Foreign Policy”

Prepared by: A.Š.

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