Why the EU Needs to Rethink Its Relationship with Serbia
For over a decade, the European Union’s strategy towards the Western Balkans has primarily focused on pragmatic approaches—prioritizing regional stability to avert significant disruptions across the continent, while EU hopefuls have found themselves stuck in the accession process. Rather than demanding genuine reforms, Brussels has formed alliances with hardline leaders capable of providing short-term stability.
Currently, one of the authoritarian figures receiving the most leniency from the EU, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, is encountering a serious challenge to his authority—one that also puts the EU’s regional strategy at risk.
Brussels must now weigh whether to persist in its current approach, despite potential ramifications for Kosovo and Montenegro. It faces a choice between maintaining a stabilocracy policy or embracing genuine integration based on merit.
In Belgrade, the EU confronts an unprecedented level of resistance: unlike protests in Georgia or Moldova, Serbian demonstrators, frustrated by the EU’s leniency towards Vučić, have not displayed European flags or called for Brussels’ support. However, this indulgence towards Vučić may soon become untenable.
There is cautious hope that Montenegro might be the first to join the EU, yet its political stability is frequently compromised by interference from Serbia.
Last week, Serbian Prime Minister Miloš Vučević resigned, seen as a strategic move amid increasing internal instability. His departure followed mass student protests—the largest in Serbia since Slobodan Milošević’s regime collapsed.
The immediate catalyst was widespread anger over a tragedy at the Novi Sad train station in November, where a collapsed canopy resulted in fifteen fatalities. This incident marks just the latest bout of discontent, as five months prior, citizens rallied against a lithium mining agreement between Serbia and Germany. While this deal was praised in the West for reducing reliance on China, many Serbs viewed it as yet another instance of reckless governance, environmental hazards, and the prioritization of foreign interests over local welfare.
In light of this, the EU is caught in a dilemma. As the largest economic entity in the region, it cannot afford to dismiss the Serbian government. However, its leniency towards Vučić’s administration has had unexpected repercussions. By refraining from applying pressure, Brussels has unwittingly granted Belgrade considerable power, encouraging it to deepen cooperation with Russia and China, aware that there will be little resistance. The EU has offered economic incentives without real enforcement mechanisms—essentially providing only benefits with no consequences.
Yet, Serbia is not merely another troubled state; its trajectory significantly influences the entire Western Balkans.
This is particularly evident regarding Kosovo, which remains trapped in a stalemate with Belgrade over its EU aspirational path. Despite Kosovo’s substantial democratization efforts, the EU continues to demand one-sided concessions, even after the Banjska incident in 2023, when Serbian-backed paramilitaries killed a Kosovo police officer. While Brussels insists on de-escalation, it has avoided imposing meaningful penalties on Belgrade. Meanwhile, Kosovo stands as the only Western Balkan nation without EU candidate status, reinforcing the notion that EU accession relies more on geopolitical calculations than on merit.
Montenegro, often viewed as a frontrunner in the EU accession race, exemplifies this situation. Although there is hope that it could be the first nation to join the EU, its political stability is often undermined by Serbian meddling. Nationalist rhetoric continues to permeate Montenegro’s political narrative, hindering its focus on essential reforms demanded by the EU. A genuinely European Montenegro could serve as a success story for both the region and the EU, yet the nation remains susceptible to external pressures that have hindered its progress for years.
A shift in the EU’s approach is still achievable.
First, Brussels must reinstate stricter measures, particularly against Serbia. Overlooking election fraud, media suppression, and authoritarianism has been detrimental to both the Western Balkans and the EU. As Brussels aims to project power globally, tolerating the erosion of democracy within its borders only damages its credibility. While the notion of linking EU funding to tangible reforms is often discussed, it becomes meaningless without proper implementation.
Secondly, the EU could bolster efforts to prosecute officials implicated in crimes like those from the Banjska attack or electoral fraud. It should also continue supporting Montenegro and Kosovo, as Serbia’s meddling in the region poses an obstacle to genuine stability, rather than facilitating it.
By refraining from pressuring Vučić, the EU inadvertently empowers the Serbian government. If Brussels truly endorses democracy in the Western Balkans, it must support Serbian citizens rather than their authoritarian leaders.
Lastly, the EU must recognize that Vučić’s regime is losing legitimacy. It remains uncertain whether he can weather this storm by ramping up repression, turning to Russia, dwelling in the hope that this moment will pass with divided tactics, or trying to reclaim credibility through early elections. What is clear is that the latest protests signal a generational shift—one that Brussels can no longer afford to overlook. The current Serbian government does not serve as a strategic ally for the EU. If Brussels genuinely advocates democratic values, it must rally behind Serbian citizens and not their authoritarian rulers.
This moment presents a unique opportunity for the EU to reclaim its transformative influence in the region. The youth of the Western Balkans, who have grown up amidst globalization, connectivity, and democratic aspirations, could be the catalyst for much-needed change. These young individuals have witnessed the advantages of democratic standards; if the EU empowers them, they could drive the region towards a future aligned with Brussels’ long-term strategic interests.
But will the EU take action? Up till now, its response has been lackluster. Just like the situation with the war in Ukraine, it risks being overshadowed by the maneuvers of the Donald Trump administration, with US President’s special envoy Richard Grenell already signaling support for Vučić.
The EU must determine whether to seize this moment and support those genuinely working to usher in stability, or allow yet another opportunity to slip away.
Assigned by A.Š.
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