Border expulsion, detention, and entry bans do not depict the relationship between states and citizens; rather, they reflect the dynamics between politicians and the ruling elites in Belgrade and Podgorica.

This viewpoint is shared by sources from “Vijesti” regarding the recent expulsion of Ivan Vuković, a member of parliament from the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) in Serbia, and similar occurrences that have transpired across the border in recent years.

The notable parliamentary figure from the leading opposition party was detained in Belgrade on March 15, coinciding with a significant protest in the city. He received a one-year entry ban into Serbia, categorized as a “security threat.” Just a day prior, Vuković had shared a video via social media, welcoming students who marched to the capital to participate in the protest.

Such practices have persisted for years; Montenegrin politicians have faced border detentions, while former Minister of European Affairs Jovana Marović was expelled from Serbia.

Conversely, in the final days of the DPS leadership in 2020, musicians and scholars were barred from entering Montenegro, and the Serbian ambassador was declared persona non grata.

When asked about the continual occurrence of such practices in state relations, a political analyst from Belgrade, Cvijetin Milivojevic, provided an evaluation for “Vijesti,” asserting that these events are more about the political elites in power than inter-state relations.

“This should not be labeled as a continuity of relationships between two nations but rather as an exchange among the political elites currently in power – encompassing both the former political leaders in Montenegro and the present ones along with the same political figureheads in Serbia.”

Similarly, project associate at the Center for Civic Education (CCE), Nikola Mirkovic, suggests that citizen-to-citizen relations are significantly better than those among politicians.

“Actions such as specific detentions at border crossings based solely on one’s political beliefs reflect unnecessary and unpleasant political messaging.”

However, Mirković distinguishes between these occurrences and the act of declaring an ambassador persona non grata.

“In cases of ambassadors being declared persona non grata, as well as other developments, it is crucial to avoid generalizations and to understand the distinct reasons for these decisions. It must be emphasized that many individuals in Serbia, particularly among the authorities, do not acknowledge Montenegro as an independent and sovereign state; instead, they attempt to affect internal matters in Montenegro or breach diplomatic protocols, inappropriately addressing the issue of Montenegrin identity,” he asserts, adding that it is uncommon for a Montenegrin official to deny or demean Serbian identity, which has occurred on multiple occasions with certain Serbian officials.

Milivojević recalls that the dynamic between the current Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and former Montenegrin leader Milo Đukanović was “close to friendship,” although this relationship has shifted over time.

He notes that the Serbian president will leverage Vuković’s presence in Belgrade until March 28, coinciding with planned counter-protests, using it as evidence of a purported “color revolution” against him.

“He hints that some power centers among key Western representatives are behind these events, yet he is unable to explicitly name Washington, Germany, or others. It’s easier to accuse the Croat Ustashas, ‘Montenegrin enemies,’ or other less influential countries driven by their interests,” he states.

Mirković: Serbia bears a greater blame for deteriorating relations

Mirković remarks that citizens are “interconnected in numerous ways,” yet asserts that Serbia has significantly shaped the nature of their relationship, often negatively.

“We must remember that the two nations share a historical connection through several common states in this region, with relationships among citizens fostered through family, business, and other links. Infrastructure, economic, tourism, healthcare, and educational ties are also significant, making it beneficial for both countries to cultivate positive relations.”

However, he insists that enhancing relations necessitates improved communication.

“Both states must acknowledge each other as independent entities and establish a relationship founded on courtesy, respect, and equality—even amid disagreements. This element is presently lacking, especially from the official Serbian perspective.”

Milivojević: There is no reason they shouldn’t align

The Belgrade-based journalist emphasizes that the major distinction between Montenegro and Serbia lies in NATO membership, with Serbia opting not to join. Despite this, he states that there is no justifiable reason for them not to maintain aligned positions in international relations for the most part.

“The issue that has begun to tarnish relations between Serbia and Montenegro is Montenegro’s recognition of Kosovo 17 years ago, but this topic has been largely sidelined. Recently, neither side, particularly those with positive intentions, has raised this issue,” Milivojević suggests.

Vučić recalls Milo’s final days in power

Milivojević remarks that the current actions of Serbian authorities resemble the behavior of DPS members during the concluding stages of their governance.

“At this point, Vučić appears as an uncertain ruler, akin to Đukanović in the last phase of his tenure when he became the focal point of widespread protests manifested through marches and similar gatherings. He finds himself in a predicament where support from his own party falls short, compelling him to establish an exaggerated sense of ultra-loyalty among followers. He perceives threats even from members and officials within his ranks.”

Milivojević draws parallels with the travel bans imposed on the musicians Vlada Georgieva and the poet Matija Bećković, linking their treatment to their origin, while also touching upon similar actions taken against writer and actor Fedja Štukan.

He further points out that no political figure in Serbia harbors ill feelings towards Montenegro, although some may express preference for particular parties or leaders.

Marović is safe.

Mirković emphasizes that all politicians have the right to be where they believe they belong, asserting that their constituents should judge the appropriateness of such presence.

“MP Ivan Vuković posed no security threat to Serbia; as a bystander to the protest in Belgrade, he expressed his observations through social media in a manner similar to any university professor exercising their role. This is not an isolated incident; Jovana Marović experienced similar treatment during her time outside her official capacity as Minister of European Affairs.”

Reflecting on the case of former Serbian and Montenegrin leader Svetozar Marović, currently residing in Belgrade under a pending extradition request from Montenegro, alongside various members of criminal factions operating in both nations, Mirković observes that Serbian authorities often ignore Montenegro’s extradition requests when convenient but act swiftly under political directives.

“The utilization of state secret services to detain a legislator from a neighboring country based on social media activity is a facet of the narrative preferred by Aleksandar Vučić’s agenda and media, seeking to portray student protests in Serbia as merely dissatisfaction with his administration,” he argues, asserting that “it seems acceptable for Vučić and his allies when a politician from Montenegro visits Belgrade to endorse his party, but intolerable when they support opposition to his regime.”

Milivojević indicates that while the actions may lack ethical integrity, the ongoing protests in Serbia are more of a civil-student nature than political.

He further comments that the Serbian administration appears to feel inadequate support among its electorate, leading to the stirring of animosity towards certain politicians and authorities in the region.

“Vučić’s regime is structured around cultivating a personality cult, blurring the lines between himself and the state, while propagating fear that any attempt at overthrowing him is tantamount to an assault on Serbia and the Serbian people,” he explains.

Milivojević recalls that protests in Belgrade attracted individuals from various parts of the globe, who may not have attended the protests specifically, but ended up participating nonetheless.

Addressing the shared issue of organized crime syndicates, he claims that neighboring authorities have largely failed to collaborate effectively in combating this issue.

“In the conflicts involving various crime factions, primarily rooted in Montenegro, these issues were transferred to Serbia where their capital grew. Some of these factions associated closely with Vučić’s regime. It’s clear that, while the authorities in Serbia do not do much to curb this trend, they also seem unperturbed by the developments,” he concludes.

The SNS government resists change

Milivojević stresses that to foster improved relations, a responsible government must emerge that acknowledges the standing position of the state and the Serbian populace within the region, as outlined in Serbia’s Constitution, which mandates care for Serbs beyond its borders.

“A representative framework needs to be established, clearly indicating that this current government does not fit the bill. It has squandered its opportunities over the last 13 years… To achieve this, a transformation in the mindset of those in governmental roles is imperative, especially as many have origins in the 90s. Conversely, Montenegro experienced a similar change just over four years ago, suggesting that a complete reset is achievable.”

However, he emphasizes that the current ruling body in Serbia is resistant to change and has failed to heed the messages of citizens revealed through recent protests.

The fall of Vučić might enhance relations

Both analysts concur that a shift in government in Serbia would present a genuine opportunity to mend ties with Montenegro.

Mirković asserts that the future under potential successors to Vučić holds significant implications.

“Given the substantial influence of the current Serbian administration in Montenegro, a governmental shift would undoubtedly revitalize quality diplomatic endeavors and pave the way for a more positive ambiance between the two nations. Naturally, this would hinge on the nature of the new government in Serbia, acknowledging that many political participants harbor similar perspectives on Montenegro.”

Yet he adds that any change in power in Serbia would likely reshape the political landscape in Montenegro as well, along with its constituents aligned with Vučić’s approach.

Milivojević counters that there exists no animosity towards Montenegro among any political entities within Serbia, easing the path forward for enhanced relations; he presumes that Montenegro would reciprocate with a desire for improved communication.

“Particularly when both nations share the same aspiration: the journey towards EU membership is a unifying goal,” he states, adding that “no one in Serbia disputes Montenegro’s statehood.”

The Belgrade analyst acknowledges that while the recognition of Kosovo by Montenegro is a grievance in their relationship, such matters should not be ignored or resolved hastily but rather opened for discourse to allow both sides to present their arguments.

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