If there is no agreement with the government on addressing the political crisis by the end of the fifteen-day suspension from the parliament imposed on the opposition by Andrija Mandic, the opposition intends to continue actions aimed at halting the government’s activities and reinstating its conduct within the bounds of the legal framework.

This was stated to “Vijesti” by the president of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), Danijel Zivkovic.

In an email interview, he noted that the alleged leader of the “Zemun clan,” Luka Bojović, is “not the sole individual exerting pressure” on Montenegro’s President Jakov Milatović regarding the formation of a government with the DPS in Podgorica. He indicated that this effort constitutes a “broader action of joint forces involving individuals linked to organized crime and certain individuals from the Church who previously held positions in security services of the Republic of Serbia.”

Your party is set to elect a new Main Board (GB) at the DPS Congress scheduled for tomorrow. What percentage of new members should be expected?

Answering your question requires context, as the Congress acts not only to adopt documents but also to elect new General Assembly members. The Congress comprises 588 delegates who will electronically vote on the proposed candidates. Consequently, I cannot speculate on the voting outcome, nor can I predict the percentage of new members that will be elected.

Moreover, I believe that the success of political processes within a party should be evaluated based on quality rather than quantity. Hence, the real consideration lies not in how many new members will be appointed, but rather in the quality of those who will serve. I can confidently assert that regardless of who is elected, DPS will secure a high-quality new Governing Board.

When will the Civic Assembly elect members of the Presidency, and how many new individuals will you propose for that body?

Post-election to the new General Assembly, the party president will suggest a new composition for the Presidency at the first subsequent session, followed by a proposal to the newly elected Presidency regarding the General Secretariat makeup, including the Secretary General, Political Director, Business Director, and Spokesperson. This will complete the four-year process of DPS reform initiated during the Ninth Congress.

Regarding specific names, it’s premature to discuss them now. However, I assure you that DPS encompasses a constellation of capable individuals constituting a new political generation, and we have no reservations about assembling a team focused on strengthening citizen trust in our party.

What motivated the DPS to amend its party statute and include a provision for an honorary president?

To clarify for the readers, the new statute allows for an honorary president, who will be elected from among former DPS presidents. As I have previously noted, Milo Djukanovic will be nominated for this role at the upcoming Congress.

This decision was made by the new leadership as a gesture of gratitude towards Mr. Đukanović for his significant contributions over the 25 years he led the party. I believe few parties in Europe can highlight achievements comparable to those of the DPS in recent years. Moreover, during that period, we made critical strides in state policy that we can fairly label historic.

DPS operates like a large family, unified across all levels—from the youngest members in the Youth Council, which I was once part of, to the most seasoned individuals who have long managed state policy. Our strength lies in the unity and institutionalization at all operational tiers, which our political competitors find challenging to penetrate.

Is there a demand among DPS members for Mr. Đukanović to be nominated for this title, and how did he react to this suggestion?

The DPS membership unanimously supports the nomination of Mr. Đukanović as honorary president.

What is your perspective on the critical remarks made by DPS MP Nikola Janović regarding the honorary president title? He recently mentioned that “the concept of honorary presidents… is not particularly appealing to him,” and warned that such a title could lead to “misinterpretations and narratives imposed by other parties in the public space, which is unnecessary”?

From the broader context of Mr. Janović’s remarks, it’s clear that there is no room for misrepresentation or incorrect interpretations. Mr. Janović himself stated that Milo Đukanović harbors no ambition to act as a shadow leader, confirming this through his own conduct, which shows no interference in political activities.

Those opposing us will persist in scrutinizing the character and work of Milo Đukanović, regardless of whether he holds the honorary president title. This only underscores their fixation on the past, as they lack the vision to present new prospects to the citizens.

Additionally, Mr. Janović acknowledged the rationale of those who drafted the Party Statute, indicating that the honorary president’s appointment is a form of recognition and appreciation, a sentiment he deemed a considerate gesture, emphasizing that certain individuals have made contributions that are historically significant and enduring. I believe this addition to the quote adequately addresses your inquiry.

Does electing Mr. Đukanović as honorary president pose a risk to the coalition potential of the DPS? If not, why do you believe that?

It often appears that our competitors are overly concerned about the coalition capacity of the DPS, seemingly intent on politically marginalizing us. One might conclude that they are, as well-meaning citizens, thoughtfully considering what is in the best interest of our party’s future. By that logic, policy decisions should be deferred to the current parliamentary majority.

I trust that my somewhat ironic lead into this answer clarifies my view on the “well-meaning counsel and observations” from our media and political adversaries. Historically, the DPS has never refrained from public decisions that follow the simplest path to popularity. Rather, we have consistently taken the more arduous yet correct route, making substantial and often misconstrued decisions that have sustained our authority for nearly three decades. Today, after five years in opposition, we remain Montenegro’s most influential political party with nearly 30 percent support.

How does the DPS plan to regain state power given its current coalition potential?

I reject claims circulating publicly that depict the DPS’s coalition potential as weak. To clarify, all administrations established by our party have formed as coalitions, collaborating with parties such as the Social Democratic Party, Social Democrats, and Liberal Party, including esteemed minority parties, enhancing our political alliances.

Up until August 30, 2020, this was a pro-European and civic coalition that held the parliamentary majority in Montenegro. Following those elections, the political landscape shifted, yielding a victorious nationalistic and populist regime. This type of national-populist politics succeeded once again in the June 2023 elections, forming a government comprising “For the Future of Montenegro,” the Europe Now Movement (PES), and the Democrats. Today, civic and European politics represent a minority in Montenegro, thus, it is logical that the DPS, as the cornerstone of such politics, finds itself in opposition. Consequently, it is equally reasonable that nationalists and populists are reluctant to collaborate with us, just as we have little desire to engage with them.

Ultimately, the DPS does not yearn for power, nor do we base our decisions on calculated risks for rapidly assuming state management positions. We act to uphold the values we represent and are patient in waiting until they once again resonate with the majority in Montenegro. Local election outcomes and public opinion surveys lend credence to this optimism. The parliamentary majority—except in Berane—has remained in the minority across other cities, exhibiting a significant drop in support since the last parliamentary elections. In contrast, the DPS has competed independently in all elections, achieving an aggregate result of 27.17 percent, whereas, as a four-member coalition, our outcome was 23.15 percent during the parliamentary elections in those six municipalities. These trends are indicative.

Lastly, while the coalition comprising “For the Future of Montenegro,” PES, and Democrats garnered around 60 percent support in the parliamentary elections, a January survey indicated their support at approximately 40 percent. Consequently, the era of nationalist and populist politics is gradually waning, while civic and pro-European forces led by the DPS are strengthening. Thus, the expectations for political transformation following the next parliamentary elections in Montenegro are significant.

Will the current stance of the DPS regarding the exclusion of members accused or convicted of corruption crimes change, given that their reputation may damage the party’s image as stated in the existing Statute?

It’s critical to differentiate “accused” from “convicted” as the terms aren’t synonymous as presented in your question. The disparity between an accusation and a final court ruling is substantial, underscored by the fundamental principle of presumption of innocence.

However, your inquiry opens the floor to reflect on the past several years. You likely recall the narratives spun by our political adversaries pre-August 30, declaring vast corruption rampant among DPS officials, alleging that they would flee the country with cases of stolen money. What became of these allegations, even with a selectively biased prosecution? The count of DPS officials facing confirmed indictments can be listed on one hand, and these concern policy implementations rather than personal corruption claims.

Let’s refrain from hasty judgments and grant individuals the right to fair trials within reasonable timeframes, which is a fundamental human right.

Why does the DPS leadership persistently acknowledge past mistakes while refraining from identifying specific errors, individuals accountable for these mistakes, or accepting party responsibility for various scandals?

The fact that DPS continues to dominate the political dialogue in Montenegro is a source of satisfaction for us. This is further validation of our party’s strength, as even from an oppositional stance, we remain the pivotal axis around which political conversations and dynamics revolve.

It’s been five years since the governmental transition. We understood the electorate’s message on August 30 and embarked on a four-year reform cycle that led to Montenegro’s first internal party elections and the establishment of new leadership at all levels—from the party president and vice-president to local leadership, culminating in a new Presidential and General Assembly convocation. Over this time, particularly during last year’s direct elections held under the motto “We can do better”, we have discussed the flaws in our policies during our time in power and do not intend to revisit that narrative. The citizens of Montenegro, the only judges of our reforms, have already rendered their verdict regarding our performance.

Five years have lapsed since the governmental change, and there is no longer a focus on events predating 2020. It’s time for us to articulate our vision for the future and the continued development of Montenegro, encapsulated within our congress documents.

Are the criminal and corruption cases involving high-ranking DPS officials, such as Mr. Svetozar Marović, indicative of failures in your party’s policies?

As previously stated, there has been ample reference to the pre-2020 period, and this inquiry has been addressed numerous times in public discourse. Five years post-government change, the question is not focused on past events but rather on what the future holds for Montenegro.

Why did the DPS not hinder the recent vote on the 2025 budget if it stated it would obstruct parliamentary proceedings until the Constitutional Committee’s conclusion on the termination of Dragana Đuranović’s judicial role in the Constitutional Court was reversed? Was this a “gentleman’s agreement” with the head of Parliament, Mr. Mandić, following his party’s withdrawal that allowed for the formation of the Budva government of which you are a part?

No, that is incorrect. The situation in Budva cannot be classified as a part of any political agreement. The issue of Budva questioned whether democracy still exists in Montenegro and whether elections carry meaning, or if governmental formation relies on one’s ability to rapidly embed individuals within certain institutions.

Furthermore, the unilateral ejection of opposition MPs by Andrija Mandić represented a clear provocation aimed at disrupting the stabilization of political conditions. This was primarily a message to Prime Minister Milojko Spajić, illustrated by Mandić’s assertion that the removal served as “a message to those who think they can negotiate with part of the parliamentary majority”, in an attempt to spur further radicalization and instability. While Mandić’s agenda appears solely focused on destruction and chaos in Montenegro, the Montenegrin opposition does not share this intent. Thus, we chose not to rise to this provocation. Nevertheless, should this approach prevail among the parliamentary majority, we shall be compelled to act against the governmental demolition of institutions. Discussions for a unified opposition response in such scenarios are ongoing.

Will the DPS MPs, who were given a fifteen-day suspension from the plenary assembly, return to sessions once their “sentence” concludes? What actions will DPS take under current political circumstances, and what will you advocate?

We have repeatedly stated that there will be no ordinary parliamentary work nor participation from the opposition in the uninterrupted daily operations until the ruling regarding the unconstitutional retirement of a Constitutional Court judge is revoked. Meeting this condition is vital for the preservation of the rule of law in Montenegro. Essentially, I have addressed your question; however, to elaborate once more: if no agreement is reached between the opposition and the government before the suspension expires, we shall progress with actions aimed at halting the government and reinstating its conduct within the bounds of legal order.

DPS has consistently stated it will not provide minority support to anyone in Budva. What positions should DPS aspire to achieve, when, and will your party gain any roles in the executive or legislative branches there? If so, which positions?

This represents a principled stance from DPS, applicable not only in Budva but across all levels. While your query is appealing, likely attracting the interest of many readers, I must emphasize that, regardless of how daunting the current political climate may appear, the allocation of positions is secondary for DPS regarding Budva. Our primary aim is the stabilization of the political and social atmosphere in the city, which has undergone four election cycles within four years, leading to a state of disorder. Further, we aspire to witness a significant distinction in development between the areas where DPS is part of the government versus those where we remain in opposition. These are our primary objectives, and to successful achieve them, we need competent individuals, which DPS has in abundance in Budva.

When you mentioned that, “the division of functions is not a priority,” does this imply you will refrain from joining the local executive and will not assume positions in the local legislative assembly outside of councilors?

I have already responded to this; to realize the ambitious platform proposed by Nikola Jovanović, we require quality personnel in local governance. I can confidently affirm that DPS’s personnel selection is superior, both in Budva and throughout Montenegro.

Why was it not a concern for your party to agree on a government with the list “Budva naš grad,” whose informal leader, Mr. Milo Božović, has faced multiple criminal charges from the Special State Prosecutor’s Office for connections to organized criminal groups involved in international cocaine trafficking? How did you arrive at this cooperation following previously expressed concerns that communication transcripts linked Božović to the “škaljari” criminal group?

The leader of the “Budva naš grad” list is the current mayor, Nikola Jovanović. Additionally, this is a new local and civic list, participating in elections for the first time and achieving an excellent outcome by winning both election rounds in Budva. Moreover, we have previously communicated that in every city where we can do so, we aim to shift the current parliamentary majority at the state level into opposition, and for this purpose, we welcome partners. We have accomplished this in Budva and plan to do so in Nikšić shortly.

Does it concern you that Mr. Jovanović has repeatedly indicated that he and his list have not “abandoned Božović,” that they “never forget a friend,” and that they will “always support him”?

The list leader “Budva naš grad” is Nikola Jovanović, not Milo Božović, as I have stated. Mr. Božović has been in custody for almost two years and is facing extended court proceedings. I will not delve into the personal relationship between Mr. Jovanović and Mr. Božović.

What evidence do you possess regarding your claim that the reputed leader of the Zemun clan, Luka Bojović, “played a role in the formation of the government in Podgorica”? How exactly did he participate? Do you have evidence to support this? If you do, have you reported it to the prosecution? If yes, when? If not, why not?

This statement arises from the information I possess. Furthermore, it appears that Bojović was not the sole party putting pressure on Jakov Milatović; rather, it involved a collective effort from individuals associated with organized crime and certain clerics, former members of Serbian security services.

Allow me to pose a rhetorical question to you and the public regarding the situation. Jakov Milatović actively obstructed the formation of Milojko Spajić’s government, subsequently departing from PES and leveling severe accusations against the Prime Minister and his party. This separation precipitated a shortening of his term in the capital and triggered early local elections in which he ran as part of the coalition list “For a Better Podgorica.” In that campaign, he was critical of local and state authorities, even more than the DPS. Mr. Milatović maintained this critical stance post-local elections, continuously condemning the parliamentary majority and asserting through the Movement for Podgorica on December 22 that negotiations would not occur with constitutional violators. Yet, by December 26, negotiations were underway, culminating in an agreement to form a new local government in Podgorica. Do you believe such a significant political pivot could occur without substantial external pressure prompting a complete change in viewpoint within just 48 hours? Certainly not. I have publicly addressed the entities behind these pressures.

Why didn’t you share evidence for this claim and submit it to the prosecution?

We have indeed filed numerous criminal reports with concrete evidence, including disputed contracts with the prosecution office, yet we have received no feedback on any of these reports. Should the prosecutor’s office rebuild our trust through definitive actions, then the measures you’re suggesting would seem more reasonable.

Do you agree with Mr. Djukanovic’s assessment that U.S. policy contributed to the establishment of a “Serbian world,” regarding the West and US’s approach towards the Western Balkans as “completely wrong” and “pro-Russian”?

The U.S. strategy in this region appears focused on delineating the interests of Serbia and Russia, which could lead to the de facto or de iure acceptance of Kosovo’s independence. Within this context, it seems the US administration may tolerate certain undemocratic actions from official Belgrade, both in Serbia and towards neighboring states. Washington’s intention to foster stability through normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo is viewed in Belgrade as tacit approval for aggressive actions that undermine the sovereignty of surrounding nations and promote narratives akin to “Serbian world,” which merely denotes a desire for “greater Serbia.” Technically, this policy has sparked political instability in Montenegro, a condition we have endured for the past five years. I need not articulate my stance on such policies publicly, nor their repercussions; I have consistently expressed these views in discussions with our American counterparts.

We advocate for the equality of all religious communities.

Why has the draft DPS program ceased to mention an independent Orthodox Church in Montenegro? Does this signify a withdrawal from church-related issues?

DPS consistently champions the equality of all religious communities and the fairness of religious freedoms for citizens, irrespective of their spiritual affiliations. This principle remains a steadfast cornerstone of our political actions. Linguistic nuances aside, the essence of our stance remains unchanged.

There is nothing mysterious about attending Mićunović’s funeral.

Did you and several other senior DPS officials attend the funeral of Branislav Bran Mićunović, a prominent figure in Montenegro, last April?

I believe funerals should not be politicized or construed in a political framework. It’s a tradition transcending the political sphere, offering a space that should remain intimate for the family of the deceased. I think it is inappropriate to publicly speculate on such matters, just as I would refrain from commenting on anyone’s actions within the political realm regarding this. Ultimately, it is a matter grounded in human relations, not political dynamics. I recognize this can incite various intrigues; however, there is nothing enigmatic about it—it stays true to the traditions of Montenegro.

We will not obscure our intentions in Nikšić either.

How will the DPS approach the upcoming elections in Nikšić, and who will be your list’s leader?

The party’s decision on election participation strategies will be determined following discussions among its bodies. Yet, as evidenced, we were the only political entity to independently engage in six local elections last year, realizing remarkable achievements. We have confidence in our capabilities and do not seek shelter within coalitions. Our strength will be showcased in Nikšić, where we anticipate securing the highest percentage of votes in these local elections, contributing significantly towards governmental change.

Regarding the list leader, that decision also rests on an internal party procedure. What is certain at this moment is that we possess numerous quality candidates available for selection, ensuring that public expectations will be met by whoever is chosen for this leadership role.

It was only natural to introduce a procedure for recalls.

Why has the DPS only recently introduced a precise procedure for the impeachment of the president into its Statute? What do you hope to achieve with this provision, and do you believe it constrains your authority as the head of DPS?

The statute provides a more detailed outline of the recall procedure,not only for the party president but also for the heads of municipal committees at a local level. As previously stated, the recall procedure follows logically from the election protocols of specific positions. Therefore, as we transitioned from indirect elections to direct intra-party elections, it was appropriate to revise the provisions related to recall. This constitutes the core truth concerning this facet of statutory adjustments.

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