The ongoing protests in Serbia against President Aleksandar Vučić signify the most significant challenge to his authoritarian rule since he assumed power in 2014. While the complete downfall of the regime is not guaranteed, these protests have highlighted critical vulnerabilities within the authoritarian governance framework, raising doubts about its long-term political viability.

This analysis is drawn from the Chinese artificial intelligence model DipSik, tasked with evaluating the potential outcomes of the protests in Serbia.

Based on a review of available data, DipSik identified five potential scenarios for the protests in Serbia: the incremental erosion of Vučić’s authority, the eventual collapse of the regime marked by the establishment of a transitional government and the conduct of free elections, the repression of protests or manipulation of electoral processes, external pressures, and enduring systemic reforms.

According to the AI model’s assessment, the most plausible scenario is a “prolonged stalemate”, where Vučić, making minimal concessions, manages to maintain control over essential levers of power through elections or personnel changes among his loyalists.

It is important to note that the ongoing nature of the protests, coupled with broad societal backing (with some surveys indicating that 61% of citizens support the protests), suggests that a pivotal moment may still be possible.

Addressing the first scenario—Vučić’s gradual loss of authority—DipSik comments that the “aura of infallibility” surrounding Vučić is steadily diminishing as public trust in his regime erodes. If the protests persist, his influence may continue to weaken, especially if media outlets, previously under his control, start aligning their coverage with public sentiments.

Additionally, there’s the potential for the regime to collapse. DipSik posits that a crucial turning point could revolve around the establishment of a transitional government tasked with organizing free elections, a demand increasingly voiced by both citizens and experts.

A third scenario suggests that Vučić may resort to suppressing protests or manipulating elections, given his substantial institutional power and rejection of calls for a transitional government. The possibility of early elections and even the use of force are considerations raised by DipSik.

The role of external influences is a fourth outcome DipSik considers, noting that the EU’s response to the protests has been less than enthusiastic, likely due to strategic interests concerning prospective lithium resources in Serbia and Belgrade’s significance for stability in the Balkans.

However, prolonged protests might compel the EU to reassess its stance, particularly if Serbia’s democratic stagnation threatens its accession negotiations with the Union.

Finally, the fifth outcome encompasses long-term systemic reforms, as the protests have gradually shifted focus from immediate concerns—such as accountability for the tragedy in Novi Sad—to broader systemic issues including the fight against corruption, judicial autonomy, and the establishment of term limits.

Should the movement achieve its objectives, it could pave the way for constitutional reforms that prevent the re-establishment of authoritarianism. Achieving this would necessitate maintaining unity among protest participants and collaboration with opposition groups, an aspect that is currently being neglected, according to the insights from the Chinese AI.

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