The decision by Croatia to label three Montenegrin officials as unwelcome is primarily aimed at individuals who promote an Anti-European agenda in Montenegro, including the former Croatian ambassador to France, Ivo Goldstein.

Zagreb has declared the President of the Parliament of Montenegro, Andrija Mandic, member Milan Knežević, and Vice President of the Government, Aleksević, as Persona Non Grata.

Goldstein emphasizes that this action should not be viewed merely as a Croatian issue, but rather as part of broader European policy. He asserts that the recent resolution regarding genocide in Jasenovac, which was approved by the parliamentary majority in Montenegro, is “detrimental to their own interests”.

He also points out that Serbia’s influence is evident in the relations between Montenegro and Croatia.

Furthermore, Goldstein argues that the ongoing situation reflects Russia’s strategic interests, as it seeks to redirect focus onto the Balkans, involving Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.

RSE: Croatia has declared two high-ranking officials from Montenegro and one deputy as undesirable. Did the resolution on genocide in Jasenovac serve as the final straw in a series of contentious issues, such as the plaque in Morinj and the Adriatic ship?

Goldstein: The resolution on genocide in Jasenovac is contentious, just like the other two issues you mentioned, which could also have contributed to this diplomatic protest.

Additionally, there is the case of Zoran Gopčević, a celebrated water polo player, whose alleged past involvement in a detention camp raises questions about the integrity of this list.

Zagreb had various options for a response, and they opted for this course of action.

In high-level Croatian-Montenegrin relations, not much has changed. Croatia does not obstruct Montenegro’s path to the EU but is signaling that certain actions are unacceptable.

This stance is not directed against Montenegro itself or its interests but against individuals pursuing an Anti-European direction within the country.

As a Croatian citizen, I might be perceived as having a right to define Montenegrin interests, yet I believe such approaches only harm Montenegro’s strategic aspirations toward Euro-Atlantic integration.

Montenegro is a NATO member, and the US supports its EU ambitions, making this a particularly inopportune moment.

Croatian policy aligns with EU interests

RSE: Foreign Minister Gordan Grlić-Radman stated that Croatia would not obstruct Montenegro’s EU path but mentioned “other mechanisms to influence certain decisions.” What does this imply for Croatia’s role, and how much of this is influenced by Brussels, especially as Montenegro is regarded as the most serious candidate for EU membership?

Goldstein: I believe Montenegro has many qualities that justify its EU membership. The debate about who deserves EU membership is endless—some current members have been part of the Union for around twenty years without necessarily deserving that status. Thus, I would set that debate aside. Montenegro deserves EU membership, but it needs to be validated continually.

Moreover, Croatia’s recent move aligns not just with its national policy but also with that of Europe.

Notably, EU High Representative Charles Michel cancelled his visit to Montenegro, which reflects a broader governmental stance rather than merely a decision from Croatia’s Foreign Ministry.

This should not be viewed solely as a Croatian policy; it has evolved into a European policy, with Croatia undoubtedly adhering to certain European behavioral standards.

Given the context of Russian aggression, certain dynamics within Montenegrin politics will not be overlooked by Europe, which is becoming increasingly resistant to compromises.

The strategic game being played is understood, and Brussels may indirectly complicate Montenegro’s EU accession process.

Speculating on the specifics of these processes is challenging, as I’m not well-versed in the current state of Montenegro’s accession efforts. However, a new European Commission could adopt a different approach and agenda.

In any case, the genocide resolution is ultimately harmful, working against Montenegro’s interests.

The resolution reveals Montenegro’s precarious position

While I do not wish to defend Croatian policy, it’s imperative to recognize that the relationship towards Jasenovac is a deeply contentious issue reflecting a traumatic period in Croatian, Bosnian-Herzegovinian, and former Yugoslav history, particularly concerning Jasenovac as a notorious Ustasha camp.

Moreover, Serbian policies, including those represented by Dodik on behalf of Republika Srpska, misleadingly cite figures of 700,000 victims, which is widely recognized as false.

This creates a troubling narrative of responsibility that seeks to balance the atrocities of Srebrenica and the conflicts of the 1990s.

In response, Croatian policy has recently been characterized by the denial of genocide towards Serbs in Jasenovac, which is equally false and reprehensible.

This raises the question: what role must Montenegro play in this disturbing discourse?

Why not consider similar themes related to Kurdistan? It’s effectively the same issue.

The difficulties in addressing these historical grievances and the collective memory culture are challenging, and for Montenegro, it is caught in an insecure position.

As Tito once articulated, “We do not want to be a pawn to undermine others.” It’s an unfortunate characterization, but it reflects Montenegro’s current predicament, which I regret having to acknowledge.

The influence of Serbia and Russia

RSE: The opposition in Montenegro asserts that the current government, under Belgrade’s influence, is intentionally worsening relations with Croatia to hinder Montenegro’s European aspirations. Do you believe external factors are influencing relations between the two countries?

Goldstein: The negative influence from Belgrade is undeniably present. External actors, particularly Russia, are attempting to redirect contentious issues from Ukraine to this region.

I don’t foresee a military conflict erupting in the former Yugoslav territory, but strained relations and blockages impede economic and social progress.

This aligns with Russia’s interest in shifting focus onto these areas, including Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.

The Russian strategy is to diminish Western attention on Ukraine and subsequently impose a peace solution that serves its agenda, thereby shifting interest onto the former Yugoslav territories, including Montenegro.

RSE: Could these tensions hinder Croatia’s support for Montenegro’s EU integration?

Goldstein: Despite my critical stance on Croatia’s internal and foreign policies, I do not believe Croatia will act unilaterally.

Recall Slovenia’s previous blockage of Croatia’s EU journey around 15-16 years ago for a year. I do not foresee a similar situation now.

Given Plenković’s style and Croatia’s collaborative approach to foreign policy, any opposition will be collective, not an isolated Croatian response.

Nonetheless, I hope any eventual blockades will be directed at proponents of anti-European strategies rather than Montenegro, which sincerely aspires for European integration.

RSE: Considering the current government in Montenegro, what may improve relations with Croatia?

Goldstein: The responsibility lies more with Montenegro to rectify the situation. Regrettably, I must assert that the resolution was a foolish move—there’s simply no other way to describe it. It should not have been part of Montenegrin policy, especially at this delicate juncture both internationally and domestically.

It feels externally imposed.

If I were to advise Montenegrin politics, it would be wise to step back, pursue legal avenues, and distance itself from contentious topics that bear no relevance.

A step like that could help restore a more positive trajectory in bilateral relations.

Confronting the past

RSE: Can we assert that these developments are rooted in an inadequate reckoning with crimes in the Balkans, particularly regarding one’s own history?

Goldstein: Absolutely. Last year, I published a work examining historical revisionism and jurisprudence in Croatia from 1989 to the present.

While focusing on Croatia, I also addressed Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, there is a notable lack of willingness among these nations to confront their real histories, especially concerning the events of 1991-95 or 1941-45.

We witness the rise of revisionist forces across all these societies—from Croatia to all factions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and even Montenegro alongside a resurgence of Chetnik sentiments.

This indicates a struggle to find a pathway in contemporary politics.

Unless we confront the dark chapters of our histories, we will struggle to address current political issues adequately.